Industrial Revolution · 1910
How far did the Meiji state industrialise Japan?
The seminar question: “How far was Japan’s industrialisation the achievement of the Meiji state?”
After American warships under Commodore Perry forced Japan open in 1853–54, the Meiji government that took power in 1868 set out to make the country rich and strong. The state built railways and model factories such as the Tomioka silk mill (1872), and private firms such as the Osaka Spinning Company (1883) led the next phase.
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Japan industrialised because its leaders had watched what Western industrial power did to China and resolved to escape the same fate. The Opium War of 1839–42, which Britain fought after China tried to stop British merchants selling Indian opium, showed that steam-powered navies could humble the greatest empire in Asia, and when Commodore Perry’s American steam warships arrived in 1853 Japan had no answer. The commercial treaties of 1858, unequal treaties imposed under threat, opened ports including Yokohama, fixed Japan’s import tariffs low, at about five per cent from 1866, and gave foreigners their own courts; Japan regained full control of its tariffs only in 1911. After seizing power in 1868 the Meiji government abolished the domains, the semi-independent territories of some 270 feudal lords, each rather like a province with its own prince. Led by former samurai of the old warrior class, it created an army raised by compulsory service and taxed land in cash to fund modernisation. Its slogan was fukoku kyōhei, “rich country, strong army”, which made industry a matter of national survival.
The short answer
- The shock of Western power. Japan’s leaders watched Britain’s steam-powered navy defeat China in the Opium War of 1839–42, fought after China tried to stop British opium sales, and in 1853 the American Commodore Perry’s steam warships showed that Japan could not keep foreigners out. The unequal treaties that followed, signed under threat, capped Japan’s tariffs, its taxes on imports, and the reach of its courts. Many samurai, members of the hereditary warrior class, concluded that only an industrial economy could pay for the army and navy needed to escape China’s fate, which made industrialisation a matter of national survival. Fear of the West became the driving force of Japanese modernisation.
- A state that chose industry. The Meiji government, the regime that took power in 1868, abolished the domains of the daimyo, the feudal lords who had ruled Japan’s regions, created a national army by conscription, compulsory military service, and a land tax paid in cash, and used the revenue to build railways, telegraphs, shipyards and model factories for private firms to copy. It sent the Iwakura Mission of 1871–73, a delegation of senior ministers, to study the United States and Europe, and hired about three thousand foreign experts. Where private capital was lacking, the state took the first risks, much as the economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron’s theory of late development predicts.
- An educated, commercial society. Japan began its modern era in 1868 with assets from the Tokugawa period, the 265 years of military rule before it: large cities such as Edo, today’s Tokyo, and Osaka, national markets for rice, silk and cotton, merchant houses such as Mitsui that dated from the seventeenth century, and a population in which perhaps 40 per cent of boys received some schooling. Rural households already spun, wove and reeled silk, unwinding it from cocoons, for sale. These traditions supplied modern industry with workers, managers, capital and customers.
- Silk paid for machines. Raw silk was Japan’s great export, helped in the 1860s by a disease that devastated European silkworms. Reeled, or unwound from cocoons, by young women in Nagano and Gunma and shipped through Yokohama to France and the United States, silk earned the foreign currency that paid for imported machines, ships and Indian raw cotton. Japan’s heavy industry of steel and ships was financed in part by its light industry of textiles, and its light industry by the labour of its daughters.
THE TURNING POINT
The Osaka Spinning Company, 1883. The Osaka Spinning Company is the hinge because it proved that private, profit-making, large-scale industry could work in Japan. Earlier government mills had been small and mostly unprofitable. Shibusawa Eiichi, a former official turned banker, raised capital from aristocrats and merchants, imported 10,500 spindles, the rods that twist fibre into thread, used steam power and ran two shifts, day and night, with electric light from 1886. The mill made steady profits, investors copied it across the Osaka region, and within fifteen years Japan had turned from an importer of cotton yarn into an exporter. Once private investors saw that industry paid, Japan’s industrialisation could run on profit as well as policy.
What it changed
Japan competes in Asian markets. Japan’s mills soon challenged their teachers: by the 1900s Japanese cotton yarn and cloth competed with British and Indian goods in China and Korea, and Japanese shipping lines carried Indian cotton to Osaka. Japan became the first Asian country to beat the industrial West at its own trade in Asian markets, and reformers from China to India studied its example. In a world economy that cast most of Asia as a supplier of raw materials, Japan alone had escaped that role, showing that the gap between the industrial West and the rest of the world could be closed.
Empire becomes part of the economy. Taiwan supplied sugar and rice, Korea rice and land, and the Japanese-run South Manchuria Railway coal and soya beans, all on terms that served Japan. Colonial rule brought railways and factories built for Japanese purposes, and harsh treatment for those who resisted. Many Koreans lost land in the colonial land survey of 1910–18 and later emigrated to Japan and Manchuria as cheap labour. Japan had escaped colonial rule by industrialising, and then imposed it on its neighbours to feed that industry.
Regulation arrives a generation late. The protests against pollution from the Ashio copper mine, the mill girls’ strikes and the government’s survey of factory conditions in 1903 led to Japan’s first Factory Act in 1911, enforced only from 1916, which limited the hours of women and children. As in Britain, regulation followed a generation behind industrial growth, because the costs of industry fell first on those with the least power to stop them.
The full answer, argued
The state’s role was decisive at the start. It abolished the domains, the territories of the feudal lords, created the taxes that paid for modernisation, built the railways and telegraphs, founded factories such as the Tomioka silk mill and the Yawata steelworks, and hired foreign experts, all within a generation, as the economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron’s model of late development predicts. Yet many state enterprises lost money and were sold cheaply to private firms in the 1880s, and the industries that earned Japan’s foreign currency, cotton spinning and the reeling of silk thread from cocoons, grew mainly through private investment, from the banker Shibusawa’s Osaka Spinning Company to thousands of small rural silk workshops. Historians such as Thomas Smith stressed the state, while later work by Penelope Francks and others emphasises the inheritance of markets, merchants and literacy from the Tokugawa shoguns, the military rulers who governed until 1868, and the labour of young women. A balanced judgement credits the state with setting the direction and removing obstacles, and private enterprise and women’s labour with doing most of the work. Countries that industrialise late can use the state to accelerate industry, but they still need a society ready to respond.
An interesting fact
Recruiting workers for the Tomioka Silk Mill in 1872 proved surprisingly hard, because of a rumour that the French staff drank the blood of young women; they had been seen drinking red wine. To reassure families, the mill’s first director, Odaka Atsutada, enrolled his own daughter Yū, then about fourteen, as one of the first trainees, and other officials followed his example. The brick buildings, put up by Japanese carpenters and tilers working to a French design, still stand, and in 2014 UNESCO, the United Nations’ cultural agency, listed the mill as a World Heritage Site. Industry needed the trust of families as well as machines, and the officials who built it sometimes had to win that trust by sending their own daughters in first.
This is the study layer of Industrialisation of Meiji Japan, chapter 10 of The Industrial Revolution, 1750–1914; the full index of the atlas is here.
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