Industrial Revolution · 1914
Who gained most from the Industrial Revolution?
The seminar question: “Who gained most from the Industrial Revolution by 1914, and was the price worth paying?”
By 1900 Europe and the United States made about 85 per cent of the world’s manufactured goods, while China’s share fell to about six per cent and India’s to under two. By 1914 the City of London had invested about £4 billion abroad, real wages had risen since about 1850, and organised labour had become a political force.
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Measured by output, the Industrial Revolution produced a small group of clear winners. In 1750, by the economic historian Paul Bairoch’s estimates, Europe and the United States made under a quarter of the world’s manufactured goods, and China and India together about 57 per cent; by 1900 they made about 85 per cent, while China’s share fell to about six per cent and India’s to under two. Britain, the pioneer, had become the world’s banker: by 1914 the City of London, its financial district, had invested about £4 billion abroad, in railways, mines and loans to foreign governments. Within the industrial countries the gains spread slowly but widely after 1850, as real wages, pay measured by what it could buy, rose and working hours fell. The Panama Canal, opened in August 1914, was that confident world’s last great work. The lead fed on itself, because the profits of industry paid for the loans, railways and fleets that extended it across the globe.
The short answer
- Coal-powered productivity. The industrial countries’ wealth rested on machines driven by coal, which multiplied what each worker could produce. Britain mined about 287 million tons of coal in 1913, its all-time peak, and exported about a third of it to fuel other nations’ ships and factories. Countries with coal, capital and skills pulled ahead, and countries without them, or prevented from using them, fell behind. Energy was the foundation of the whole divergence.
- Diffusion through states and markets. Industrialisation spread fastest where states could protect new industries, build railways and educate engineers, as in Germany, the United States and Japan. Late starters borrowed Britain’s technology and invented their own institutions, from Germany’s investment banks, which lent long-term to industry, to the model factories built by Japan’s Meiji government, the modernising regime that took power in 1868. The result by 1914 was an industrial core of several countries competing for markets, resources and colonies. Adapting borrowed methods to local conditions decided which followers succeeded.
- Empire and unequal exchange. Colonial rule and unequal treaties, agreements forced on weaker states that fixed low tariffs, or import taxes, kept much of Asia and Africa in the role of supplier of raw materials and buyer of manufactures. Low tariffs, guaranteed returns for foreign investors and forced labour regimes such as the Congo Free State, the private colony of King Leopold II of Belgium, channelled the gains toward the industrial powers. The map’s tan and blue show how far that system reached by 1914. Political power decided who would capture the gains of the new technology.
- Workers and voters organised. The losers of early industrialisation inside Britain did not remain powerless. Luddites, who smashed machines, Chartists, who demanded votes for working men, trade unionists and socialists built organisations that won the vote, legal unions and the first welfare laws, and similar movements spread across Europe, the United States and Japan. Their pressure explains why industrial societies grew more equal in income, though not in wealth, after the middle of the century. Reform came from below as well as from above.
THE TURNING POINT
The City of London, 1914. The City of London, the capital’s financial district, is the hinge of the epilogue because it shows what the first industrial nation had become. By 1914 Britain earned more from lending, shipping and insurance than it needed to pay for its imports, and its investors held about £4 billion abroad, from Argentine railways to South African mines. Britain, once called the workshop of the world, had become its banker, while Germany and the United States made more goods. In August 1914 that interconnected system went to war with itself, and the First World War showed what industrial economies could do when they turned their factories to destruction.
What it changed
An industrial war. The industrial powers’ greatest new capacity in 1914 was for total war, waged with a nation’s whole economy, and in August they turned their steel, chemicals, railways and factories against each other. The First World War mobilised whole economies for machine guns, heavy artillery and poison gas on a scale the American Civil War had only foreshadowed, and estimates of military deaths run from about 9 to 11 million. The industrial powers had never traded more with one another than in 1913, so the war showed that economic interdependence alone could not keep the peace.
Catching up, slowly. The Great Divergence, the gap between the industrial West and the rest of the world, began to narrow only in the late twentieth century. After 1945 many former colonies sought to industrialise behind tariffs, taxes on imports, and from the 1950s Japan, then South Korea, Taiwan and finally China followed the path of earlier latecomers such as Germany: state guidance, protection and exports. Their success shows that the divergence of the nineteenth century rested on circumstances, such as capital, technology and the power to set tariffs, that later policy could change.
The carbon century. Coal, and then oil, powered the twentieth century. Carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, about 280 parts per million before industrialisation, had reached about 300 by 1914 and passed 400 in the 2010s. The first scientists to connect burning coal with a warmer planet, such as the Swedes Arvid Högbom and Svante Arrhenius, worked in the industrial world this atlas describes, and the costs they glimpsed are now global.
The full answer, argued
The clearest winners by 1914 were the owners of capital and the populations of the industrial core, who were richer, healthier and more numerous than any earlier society, and whose working classes had begun, after 1850, to share in the gains. The clearest losers were those who paid without benefiting: enslaved people whose cotton fed the first mills, handworkers from Lancashire to Bengal whose trades vanished, colonised peoples supplying raw materials on others’ terms, and the dead of famines and forced labour. Judging whether the price was worth paying raises a problem historians cannot settle with evidence alone, because the people who paid and the people who gained were mostly different, and often separated by generations and continents. Two observations help to settle it. Much of the cost came from political choices, such as slavery, empire and minimal famine relief, which were not inevitable parts of industrial technology. The gains also spread, eventually, far beyond the first industrial countries. A defensible judgement is that industrialisation was a transformation worth having, achieved at a price that was far higher than it needed to be and paid by the wrong people.
An interesting fact
Svante Arrhenius was not alarmed by his own calculation. At the rates of coal burning in his day, he expected a doubling of carbon dioxide to take something like three thousand years, and in his popular book Worlds in the Making (1908) he suggested that a warmer climate might bring milder, steadier weather and richer harvests to the colder parts of the earth, Sweden included. He did not foresee the growth of coal and oil burning in the twentieth century, which has raised carbon dioxide by about half in little more than a century and a half. Arrhenius got the direction of change right and the timetable badly wrong, because he could not foresee how fast industry would keep growing.
This is the study layer of Impact of the Industrial Revolution, chapter 12 of The Industrial Revolution, 1750–1914; the full index of the atlas is here.
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